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Capital Market Theory, Mandatory
Disclosure, and Price Discovery
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
L Introduction
The once-venerable "efficient capital market hypothesis" (ECMH)
crashed along with world capital markets in October 1987, but its resilience
has nearly matched the resilience of those markets. Despite another market
break in 1989, for example, the ECMH has continued to be reflexively
heralded by numerous corporate and securities law scholars as an accurate
account of public capital market behavior. Together with overwhelming
evidence of excessive market volatility, however, these catastrophic market
breaks revealed instinct infirmities m the ECMH that could hardly be
shrugged off as mere anomalies.
In response to the ECMH's eroding descriptive and prescriptive power,
capital market theorists found in noise theory an auxiliary explanation for
these otherwise inexplicable catastrophes. Noise theory introduced a
behavioral and psychological component to the stoical account of capital
market behavior that the ECMH offered. Noise theorists attribute market
breaks and excess volatility to irrational investors who overreact to the flow
of information. By introducing this human dimension to capital market
theory, noise theory marks a refreshing and important step toward a more
realistic understanding of public capital market behavior. Yet noise theory
ultimately constitutes only incremental tinkering with a model of capital
market behavior that is fundamentally flawed. The ECMH, as modified by
noise theory, is a reductive model-based on linear mathematics and
reasoning-that attempts to oversimplify complex dynamics.
Chaos theory has of late assumed an original and pivotal role in the
discussion and analysis of capital market behavior. By understanding
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markets as nonlinear systems, chaos theory introduces an entirely fresh
perspective on capital market behavior, one which the linear perspectives
of the ECMH and noise theory deeply obscure. This new perspective is
important because while capital market ideas rooted in the ECMH and noise
theory tell only part of the story of capital market behavior, they neverthe-
less have dominated academic discourse on state corporate and federal
securities law, particularly in the perennial debate over the system of
mandatory disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act).
The disclosure debate centers on the broad and important question of
whether the benefits of the disclosure system justify its costs. Although it
has been notably inconclusive, the disclosure debate is particularly
interesting in the way that its terms have been shaped by the methodology
underlying the ECMH. That methodology relies on investigating the impact
of discrete bits of firm-oriented information on securities prices through
linear regression analyses. Both opponents and supporters of the 1934
Act's disclosure system have seemed content to fix the terms of the debate
in this way, which implies that the central question is the swiftness and
accuracy with which information covered by the mandatory disclosure
system is reflected in stock prices. Thus, discussion at this level elevates
the role of firm-oriented information in capital market price formation to
nearly exclusive importance. Such a discussion obscures the importance of
information in the microstructure of capital markets-market transparency
and price discovery-that chaos theory subjects to close scrutiny.
This Article builds on the premise that the ECMH's linear methodolo-
gy is primitive and advances the following thesis: Obsession with the
ECMH, even by its detractors, has left overlooked a key connection
between the process of price discovery and the role of the mandatory
disclosure system. To this end, Part II first reviews a series of recent
events, including the 1987 and 1989 market breaks and the emergence of
noise theory, that have revealed the ECMH to be an inadequate account of
public capital market behavior. This review also shows that the use of the
ECMH in debate concerning mandatory disclosure ignores the importance
of other determinants of price in public capital markets. Part II also argues
that the use of event studies to assess the merits of alleged disclosure
violations is misguided because such studies rely upon the ECME and
ignore the complexities of the price discovery process. Finally, Part II
demonstrates that the noise theory critique of the ECMH points in the
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direction of these greater complexities, but has not been taken to its logical
conclusion.
Part II introduces chaos theory. By confirming that capital markets
are nonlinear systems, chaos theory's nonlinear perspective departs from the
prevailing efficiency/noise frame of reference. Part III shows that chaos
theory's perspective tends to support the existing mandatory disclosure
system. More importantly, Part III suggests that information concerning
price discovery is equally critical. Part IV, therefore, looks beyond the
role of fundamental firm-oriented information covered by the mandatory
disclosure system and toward information in the market microstructure.
That investigation confirms the implausibility of the ECMH and calls for
rejecting evaluations of the mandatory disclosure system based on the
ECMH's simplified reductive techniques. Part V argues that greater
linkage is necessary between price discovery and our understanding of the
1934 Act's mandatory disclosure system and the methods of policing
violations of the Act. To develop an understanding of this overlooked
connection requires further research into chaos theory, which this Article
urges the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate.
1I. Efficiency and Mandatory Disclosure
The proper scope of the mandatory disclosure rules has been debated
almost continually since the enactment of the 1934 Act.' While the express
purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud against investors in financial assets,2
this purpose has been subjected to substantial academic criticism. The
criticism intensified as legal theorists began to recognize the implications
of the ECMH, which was understood to provide nearly all the protection
that investors needed The evidence supporting the ECMH was particular-
ly attractive to many economists, who developed a fairly simple reductive
1. See 1 LouIs Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 171-73 (3d ed.
1989). See generally HOMER KRiPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE (1979);
Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990).
2. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) ("Congress' aim in
enacting the 1934 Act was not confined solely to compensating defrauded investors.
Congress [also] intended to deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities markets
3. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984).
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theory as to why public capital markets are efficient. The evidence showed
changes in stock price to be uncorrelated over time. The ECMH explained
this evidence by finding that information-which was assumed to be pro-
duced randomly-was rapidly and accurately impounded into stock prices.4
Many legal theorists understood this view of capital market behavior
to refute the proposition that the federal mandatory disclosure system could
be bottomed on the goal of investor protection. If the public capital
markets are efficient in a strong or even semi-strong sense, these propo-
nents argued, then compulsory disclosure is unnecessary. Under this view,
private incentives should be adequate to encourage the production or
discovery and dissemination of information important to investors. Given
these incentives, the process of information discovery and efficient price
incorporation would provide adequate investor protection and would
eliminate the need for any regulatory regime.5
Justifications for the mandatory disclosure system also used the ECMH
as a baseline. The public goods rationale of that system, for example,
views information as a public good, the production of which will benefit
free riders. As a result, under a voluntary system of disclosure or under
a state-by-state system, information will not be produced in optimal
amounts.' Despite the desire to protect investors, this public goods
rationale for the federal system of mandatory disclosure is largely
utilitarian. A variation on this theme contends that it is unnecessary to
identify third-party effects in order to defend federal mandatory disclosure
rules because even without third-party effects, registrants cannot be
expected to produce optimal amounts of information for investors.' Each
version of this theme rests on the implicit premise that the information
mandatorily disclosed would be swiftly and accurately reflected in stock
prices.
4. For the intellectual history of the random walk model, the ECMH, and related
capital market theories, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 546 (1994).
5. For a summary of these arguments, see ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 91-96 (1993).
6. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 290-91 (1991).
7. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
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While many legal theorists have invested tremendous confidence and
intellectual capital in the ECMH (though with varying degrees of enthusi-
asm), a recent series of confounding events has frustrated its usefulness as
a tool of public and legal policy-making: World capital markets crashed in
1987 and broke in 1989, but the ECMH could not explain why;' noise
theory emerged to offer more plausible accounts of such breaks and other
market phenomena that the ECMH could not explain, such as excess
volatility;9 and the invocation of the ECMH in deregulatory reforms
proved to be more rhetorical than real.' In addition, when the ECMH
finally succeeded in influencing the United States Supreme Court in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson," ECMH devotees responded with as much discontent as
satisfaction. 2
Legal theorists devoted to the ECMH have had great difficulty in
responding to these complications. Indeed, thus far it has been impossible
to offer an adequate response to the phenomena of market breaks and
excess volatility, 3 and there has been no showing that the use of the
ECMH in practice has been much more than a rhetorical one. 4 To date,
8. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 915 (1989) ("To date, no convincing
explanations of [the 1987 crash] exist.")
9. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, J. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 29-30. See generally ROBERT J. SCHILLER,
MARKET VOLATILITY (1989).
10. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 876-89 (1992).
11. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
12. See generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017
(1991).
13. Many have attempted to "reconcile" the 1987 crash with the ECMH. See
Cunningham, supra note 4, at 593 & n.243 (citing sources); see also Mark L. Mitchell &
Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications
at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545, 557 n.87 (1994) (citing
Charles J. Jacklin et al., Underestimation of Portfolio Insurance and the Crash of October
1987, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 35 (1992); Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, Triggering the
1987 Stock Market Crash: Antitakeover Provisions in the Proposed House Ways and Means
Tax Bill?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 37 (1989)).
14. Although no formal response has been made to the claim-most cogently elaborated
by Donald Langevoort, supra note 10-that the ECMH has been used only rhetorically,
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the responses that have been offered to the other two complications-Basic
and noise theory-have succeeded less in reviving the validity of the ECMH
as a useful policy tool than in revealing additional difficulties in invoking
the prevailing capital market theory for policy analysis. Moreover, while
these confounding events suggest the need for an entirely new approach to
understanding capital market behavior, responses to date have continued to
focus on the role of firm-by-firm mandatory disclosure obligations under
the 1934 Act and the overriding importance of the information that the Act
has traditionally covered.
A. Event Studies
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court decided that the primary
insight of the semi-strong form of the ECMH-"that the market price of
shares traded on well-developed- markets reflects all publicly available
information" 5-could serve as the basis for presuming that traders in a
particular security satisfy the reliance requirement in a fraud action with
respect to that security. 6 Theorists who support the ECMH as a policy
tool responded to Basic by urging the use of event studies in lawsuits
alleging violations of the 1934 Act's mandatory disclosure rules. 7
This recommendation followed from two oddly coupled premises.
First, ECMH supporters responded to Basic by taking the position that it
was unworkable to have the existence of an efficient market serve as a basis
for satisfying the reliance requirement in securities fraud cases. 8 This
argument rested largely on the claim that demonstrating market efficiency
some scholars, such as Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter, have shown how the SEC has used
the ECMH in event studies. See Mitchell & Netter, supra note 13, at 572-84.
15. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).
16. Id. at 247.
17. Advocates of the ECMH also urge its usefulness in other contexts arising under the
1934 Act's mandatory disclosure regime, such as insider trading rules. See generally
JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991).
18. See generally William J. Carney, The Limits of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine,
44 Bus. LAw. 1259 (1989); Macey et al., supra note 12; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001 (1991)
[hereinafter Macey & Miller, Revisited]; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics:An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
1059 (1990).
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was too difficult.19 Second, the same efficiency theory was nevertheless
used to advocate the "truth in the market" defense. This defense neutralizes
the presumption of reliance on the market by demonstrating that truthful
information supplied from outside the firm negated the price effect of the
fraud.20
Following these two premises, the use of event studies has been
formalized as a way to sort out which information dominated market
price-the fraud or the truth-and has been expressly advocated as a method
of determining whether a misstatement or omission was material.2 In
other words, it is argued, event studies can be used to evaluate whether
alleged violations of the mandatory disclosure rules are well-founded.
Event studies are complex models that seek to test how particular
information affects prices.' Legal theorists have attempted to present
these models in the following simplified way.' To conduct the test, the
researcher identifies the fraudulent statement or omission in question (the
"event"), defines the time period over which that statement was made or the
omission occurred (the "event window"), and then compares the actual
price change in that period with the price change that the researcher
believes would have occurred in the absence of the event.24
While event studies may be important tools for many applications, their
use in securities fraud actions-or indeed in any context evaluating legal
rules-poses important risks that should be recognized, but often are not.
19. See Macey et al., supra note 12, at 1021.
20. The truth in the market approach was developed in Daniel R. Fischel, Use of
Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38
Bus. LAW. 1 (1982).
21. See Macey et al., supra note 12, at 1021 & n.14.
22. Eugene Fama and his colleagues pioneered event studies. See generally Eugene
F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REv.
1 (1969). For the current state of event study methodology, including evaluation of its
scientific usefulness and identification of its complexities and weaknesses, see Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1599-1602 (1991).
23. For a discussion of event study methodology, see Macey et al., supra note 12, at
1028-42. Mark Mitchell and Jeffry Netter have presented a more expanded discussion of
event study methodology and its potential use in securities fraud actions. See Mitchell &
Netter, supra note 13, at 556-84.
24. The researcher determines the price change that would have occurred in the
absence of the event by using a linear pricing model such as the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) or the market model.
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First, consider the joint hypothesis problem, which frequently arises in tests
investigating the weak form of the ECMH. The problem arises because
these tests simultaneously investigate market efficiency and a linear pricing
model, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). While it is widely
recognized that linear pricing models are of uncertain validity, legal
scholars who support the ECMH nevertheless contend that weaknesses in
tests of linear pricing models do not impair the usefulness of event
studies .5
This claim must be carefully considered. First, these empiricists claim
that event studies mitigate the joint-hypothesis problem because the studies
use daily stock returns.' That approach by no means removes the
problem entirely, however. Indeed, event study methodology uses long-
term stock price histories to forecast the performance that would have
occurred absent a particular event whose impact on the stock price is being
investigated.' The approach relies precisely on some linear pricing
model.'
Second, the robustness of event studies depends on precision in
defining and dating the event.2 9 In the context of alleged disclosure
violations, this requires both identifying the particular misstatement or
omission and specifying the time period over which it could have had a
market impact. While in many cases identifying the event in this context
will be unproblematic, specifying the event window almost always will be
problematic. For example, in establishing the opening and closing dates of
25. See ROBERTA ROMANO, FOuNDATIONs OF CORPORATE LAW 62 (1993) ("The
criticism of [tests for weak-form efficiency or pricing model tests] is inapposite to event
studies because use of daily return data permits precise measurement of stock price
responses and mitigates the joint-hypothesis problem.").
26. See id.
27. Roberta Romano notes:
We begin with a model of how stock prices are normally generated, such as the
CAPM. This enables us to determine whether a piece of information (an
"event"), such as the announcement of a stock split, affects the stock price, for
we can ask whether stock returns in the event period are different from what our
pricing model predicted.
Id. at 60.
28. See id. ("Because ... the CAPM is a linear model, the statistical technique
employed is linear regression analysis, which fits the best line to the data.").
29. See id. at 62 ("When an information event can be dated precisely and the stock
price effect is large, statistical inferences are robust across asset-pricing models.").
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an event window in which to measure the effect of a discrete bit of
information, there is a trade-off between choosing a window long enough
to ensure the inclusion of all dates on which the bit may have been received
by investors and short enough to avoid the infection of the study by other
bits of information. Event study methodology calls such an infection a
"confounding event. "30
If market participants and market processes incorporate information
into prices in the linear manner assumed by the model, the problem of
confounding events might be ameliorated (it can never be eliminated). In
fact, however, the behavior of the market and its participants is nonlinear
rather than linear-information is not promptly and proportionally reflected
in prices, but is absorbed intermittently over time in indeterminate ways."
As a result, it is virtually impossible to construct an event window that will
not suffer from one or more confounding events. 2
Third, event study methodology depends on the validity of the semi-
strong form of the ECMH. The methodology assumes that choosing an
event window closing date is "straightforward ... [b]ecause the market
absorbs and processes information rapidly. " Because this is, of course,
the classical definition of the semi-strong form of the ECMH, a peculiar
problem appears. According to some of its defenders, the use of event
study methodology is necessary in securities fraud actions like Basic
because proving market efficiency is unwieldy. Yet one must assume an
efficient market to conduct the event study.' Consequently, a substantial
leap of faith in the ECMH seems necessary.
In particular, faith in event studies requires reliance on the statistical
models underlying the ECMH and its companion pricing models, such as
the CAPM and the market model. All of these models are based on linear
assumptions and calculations conducted with computer technology
30. Macey et al., supra note 12, at 1030.
31. See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text (discussing chaos theory and
mandatory disclosure). See generally Cunningham, supra note 4.
32. See Mitchell & Netter, supra note 13, at 558-59 (giving "advice" on how to
minimize confounding events).
33. Macey et al., supra note 12, at 1031.
34. Professors Macey, Miller, Mitchell, and Netter attempt to distinguish between
market efficiency and the impact of particular statements on stock prices as revealed by
event studies. Id. at 1021. Despite the effort, the reliability of the latter depends on the
validity of the former.
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introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. Current computer technology, which
began to develop in the late 1980s, employs far more sophisticated,
nonlinear mathematics and shows that the older studies are both obsolete
and unreliable.' One obvious consequence of this discovery is to
undermine event study methodology's assumption that stock returns are
random variables that follow the normal distribution. This assumption is
critical to using the methodology. Yet all agree that the assumption is not
necessarily true, but is only a rough approximation. Worse, this recent
evidence even shows that the assumption is far less of an accurate
"approximation" than previously believed.'
In short, the simple event study methodology usually presented by
legal theorists as a way to evaluate alleged violations of federal mandatory
disclosure rules masks difficulties that limit the technique's usefulness for
legal analysis. But as important as are all of these technical limits to event
study methodology-including the assumption of market efficiency-the
approach assumes that the only information that matters to price formation
is that information usually understood to be covered by the 1934 Act's
mandatory disclosure system. In other words, the new emphasis on event
studies in response to Basic rests on the implicit view that the only relevant
information is that regarding companies and industries (and perhaps
economies and world events as well). This view ignores, or implicitly
assumes away as unimportant, information concerning the manner in which
prices are discovered in capital markets.38
B. Noise Theory
Beyond the tensions implied by the advocacy of event studies in
response to Basic, in recent years legal theorists who support the ECMH
have also been constrained to confront noise theory. Economists and others
trying to understand market volatility and the 1987 and 1989 world market
breaks recognized that the ECMH was inadequate and looked to noise
35. See generally Cunningham, supra note 4.
36. See Mitchell & Netter, supra note 13, at 563.
37. See generally EDGAR E. PETERS, FRACTAL MARKET ANALYSIS (1994); EDGAR E.
PETERS, CHAOS AND ORDER IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS (1991); Cunningham, supra note
4.
38. See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text (discussing chaos theory and
mandatory disclosure).
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theory as an auxiliary account of public capital market behavior. Noise
theory holds that public capital markets are plagued by substantial irrational
trading that is based on psychological and emotional impulses unrelated to
fundamental values. Hence, even though such markets may process
information quickly ("informational efficiency"), they do not process
information solely about fundamental values ("fundamental efficiency").
While legal theorists who support the ECMH cautioned that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Basic was unworkable because efficiency is too
hard to prove, they also warned that rejecting the ECMH could have
"staggering implications. "I The validity of the fundamental/informational
distinction presented by noise theory, for example, would explode federal
securities laws. If the distinction is valid, then no rationale can support
mandatory disclosure rules because there can be no assurance that
information-of any kind-will be meaningful to investors. 4  In other
words, whereas strong efficiency claims suggest that mandatory disclosure
rules are unnecessary, strong market noise claims suggest that such rules
would be unhelpful or irrelevant.4'
The implications of noise theory's insights extend far beyond the
theory's fundamental/informational distinction, however. Noise theory does
not imply only that irrational trading pervades public capital markets with
the result that prices of capital assets are driven by information unrelated
to fundamental values. Indeed, if this were the theory's most important
insight, then its contribution to capital market theory might be seen merely
as marginal. For example, under this view, the ECMH and noise theory
would simply represent two points on a continuum defined by relative
efficiency and relative rationality. The ECMH assumes rationality and
insists on the presence of at least substantial fundamental efficiency,
whereas noise theory assumes irrationality and alleges that informational
efficiency dominates fundamental efficiency. In this sense, therefore, noise
theory is simply a variation on the theme of the semi-strong form of the
ECMH. As Part III will demonstrate, however, the more important
39. Macey & Miller, Revisited, supra note 18, at 1013.
40. See id. at 1014.
41. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 881; see also JAMES D. COx ET AL., SEcURmES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 686 (1991) ("One may simultaneously accept the
noisiness of prices and still believe that formalized disclosure (e.g., delivery of a full
prospectus) to the broad community of investors is not cost-justified with respect to larger
companies about whom a large body of information is always accessible to investors.").
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implication of noise theory is that it reveals markets to be nonlinear
systems, to which the linear mathematics and reasoning that underlie the
ECMH are inapposite.
Ill. Chaos Theory and Mandatory Disclosure
Chaos theory is one of the most widely discussed new paradigms in
American thought. Chaos theory originated in the study of physics to
describe complex systems that have the appearance of irregularity and
randomness, but that upon careful inspection reveal order and pattern.
Consequently, the term is a misnomer. A chaotic system is one that seems
random on the surface (as when investigated using linear techniques), but
that turns out to be nonrandom upon more critical inspection (as when
investigated using sophisticated techniques applying nonlinear mathematics).
A. Linearity and Capital Market Theory42
The ECMH is based on linear mathematics and reasoning. In this
context, linearity simply means proportionality-a change in one variable
will produce a proportionate change in another specified variable. There
are two senses in which the ECMH is a linear notion. First, the statistical
models underlying the ECMH are simple linear regression analyses
calculating correlation coefficients, which are statements about how
variables are related on a straight-line basis over time. In other words, a
time series of stock price data is tested for correlation by fitting a straight
line to the data and then calculating the correlation coefficient.
Second, the chief insight underlying the ECMH is linear in the sense
that the ECMH defines a proportional relationship between information
changes and price changes. In particular, the semi-strong form posits that
information is swiftly incorporated into prices without bias. In effect, the
ECMH abstracts above the processes by which price formation actually
occurs and holds that the market acts as if only fundamental information
counts-information is digested rapidly and without bias and is rendered
useless once traded upon. Under this model, market prices equal
fundamental values precisely because of the proportional relationship
between information changes about underlying real asset values and the
42. For a discussion of the effect of linearity and capital market theory on the
mandatory disclosure debate, see generally Cunningham, supra note 4.
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resulting price changes in the financial asset that represents those real
assets. 43
Noise theory agrees that information is digested rapidly and rendered
useless once traded upon, but noise theory identifies some imperfections in
the nature of the information so digested that lead to pricing biases. As a
result of this fundamental/informational distinction, prices depart from
fundamental values. But noise theory and its fundamental/informational
distinction also reveal public capital markets to be nonlinear systems, which
constitute a feedback system in which individuals alone and in the aggregate
may overreact to information or may withhold action until some additional
information has been produced. Feedback processes such as these are
hallmarks of a nonlinear system because they indicate a nonproportional
relationship between a cause and its effect (for example, between news and
price changes). 4 Whereas noise theory attributes this nonlinearity to
irrational behavior, chaos theory takes a broader view that incorporates this
insight and extends beyond it.
Adopting a nonlinear perspective, chaos theory rejects the linear
ECMH claim that public security prices behave randomly and holds instead
that there is a pattern to the seeming randomness of public security price
behavior. In practical terms, chaos theory agrees with both the ECMH and
noise theory that information is digested rapidly. Chaos theory also agrees
with noise theory that neither the process nor the result is directed purely
by fundamental information. However, it disagrees with both the ECMH
and noise theory in their belief that information is rendered immediately
useless once traded upon. Empirical studies applying the nonlinear
43. Note the circularity of the ECMIH's foundations: The hypothesis is a linear one,
and the tests of the hypothesis are also linear.
44. Nonlinearity means the absence ofproportionality-changes in one variableproduce
a change in another variable, but not necessarily a proportional change. Noise theory
teaches and explains that in the context of the ECMH, the market may react slowly or may
overreact to particular information changes about a given security. More importantly,
statistical models showing evidence of nonlinear dependence are possible precisely because
of a lack of proportionality between information changes and price changes. The distinction
between nonlinear and linear is important because observing linear autocorrelation
coefficients that are not significantly different from zero-which is the fundamental basis of
the empirical support for the ECMH-does not prove that the time series data under
investigation are not dependent. Rather, nonlinear dynamics could be present and, if
present, the series will be dependent. That implies that the system is not random, as the
ECMH claims.
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techniques of chaos theory show that information is not immediately
absorbed by market prices, as the ECMH and noise theory both predict;
rather, such information remains useful for periods of up to four years.45
Chaos theory thus reconceptualizes what noise theory has identified as
informational efficiency. Chaos theory holds that the operative information
that justifies the distinction between informational and fundamental
efficiency renders that distinction precisely antithetical to the existence of
fundamental efficiency. Because all information (fundamental or otherwise)
is digested by market participants, but is not rapidly impounded into market
prices, it ineluctably follows that such information is of critical importance.
Building upon the earlier insights derived from the ECMH and noise
theory, chaos theory also presents dramatic improvements in those models.
First, as noted, chaos theory shows that information has continuing value
even after being first traded upon, with the result that even the weak form
of the ECMH is subverted.' Second, this continuing value in turn implies
the strong possibility that there are underlying macroeconomic, structural,
and technical forces that operate in systematic ways on security market
behavior and prices and that would undoubtedly include the mechanisms of
market price discovery.47
B. Implications for Mandatory Disclosure Debate
Recall that while strong claims of market efficiency sometimes suggest
that securities regulation is unnecessary, strong claims of market noise
suggest that such regulation is sometimes unhelpful and irrelevant. Thus,
the ECMH has been invoked to deny any justification for mandatory
disclosure rules," and noise theory can be read to hold that information
45. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 573-76, 589-90 (discussing Edgar Peters's
rescaled range analysis studies and Lyaponov Exponent studies that show that public capital
markets have average cycle length of approximately four years).
46. See infra notes 58-125 and accompanying text (discussing price discovery in market
microstructure).
47. Those macroeconomic, structural, and technical forces also include such factors
as market sensitivity to investor time horizons. See generally Cunningham, supra note 4.
Such factors are neither directly related to fundamental values nor tied to irrational behavior.
48. See ROMANO, supra note 5, at 91-96; Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 909, 927-37 (1994).
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so disclosed is unhelpful to investors because of the prevalence of irrational
trading.49 As a result, both the ECMH and noise theory have difficulty
in defending the existing mandatory disclosure system. However, because
they are founded on the fragile reference points of relative efficiency and
relative rationality from which chaos theory breaks away, their prescriptive
force should be discounted.
Chaos theory holds that public capital market phenomena that seem
random (efficient) are in fact nonrandom and internally dependent.50
Chaos theory also suggests that behavior or action that may appear to be
irrational (noisy) may well be rational because it occurs in a system that is
inherently nonlinear.5 According to this view, fundamental information
of a firm-oriented nature is still critical to investors. However, the effect
of the creation and release of new fundamental information is not discrete
or linear. Rather, bits of information in effect react to one another;
therefore, each bit is only a contribution-though an indispensable one-to
a more complex systemic process. In other words, the market's treatment
of a discrete bit of information simultaneously takes into account the
systemic changes that that information implies.
The impact of discrete bits of information on markets therefore should
not be evaluated by simplified techniques constrained by a linear frame of
reference. Although measuring the market's treatment of an incremental
bit of information on its own discrete terms may be theoretically possible,
such an account is necessarily incomplete because the market is simulta-
neously treating (or deciding not to treat) other information. Accordingly,
by isolating discrete bits of information from other informational vari-
ables-whether fundamental, macroeconomic, technical, noisy, or
structural-the impact of a discrete bit of information measured by simple
linear equations used in event studies necessarily will be distorted.
Chaos theory's insight that public capital markets are nonlinear systems
also gives context to the long-recognized fact that firm-oriented information
is the least important kind of information that affects public securities
49. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 881.
50. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 582.
51. Seeid.
52. Moreover, trades are often made without regard to current changes in information.
See Robert A. Schwartz, Competition and Efficiency, in MODERNIZING U.S. SEcUrITIES
REGULATION (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds.) 383, 388 (1992) ("[P]rice
changes are not caused by informational change alone.").
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prices. 3 Far more important is information concerning the industry in
which a firm operates, the structure of the market in which the security is
traded, and macroeconomic conditions. 4 Further, as noted, all of this
information has value even after market participants first act upon it.5
Several existing disclosure rules reflect the intuition that factors other
than firm-oriented fundamental information bear strongly on public
securities prices. These factors include disclosure concerning the absence
of a trading market for the securities, the kinds of listing arrangements (if
any) that have been made for the securities, and the extent to which the
registrant or any security holder of the registrant holds shares available for
future sale. None of this information reflects or relates to fundamental
information concerning a registrant's business or financial condition. Each
of them, however, clearly affects the probable performance of the security's
price.
Even these modest disclosure rules may not be defensible within an
ECMH or noise theory framework. As noted, however, chaos theory calls
into serious doubt the basis for rejecting mandatory disclosure rules under
the ECMH and noise theory. First, chaos theory's nonlinear perspective
shows that the linear perspectives underlying the ECMH and the CAPM are
inadequate bases to test the responsiveness of price to information flows.
Second, chaos theory also suggests that noise theory is a somewhat crude
account of more subtle and complex systemic processes. With respect to
both the ECMH and noise theory, information should not be understood as
being accurately or swiftly impounded into prices. Rather, there are both
biases and lags.
This critique does not imply that chaos theory answers the critical
question of whether the federal mandatory disclosure system can survive a
cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, neither the ECMH, noise theory, nor chaos
theory alone can answer that question because none can answer the prior
question of whether registrants would produce optimal amounts of
information voluntarily. However, the most widely (though not universally)
accepted view is that firms are not likely to disclose voluntarily, whether
because of third-party effects or otherwise.56
53. See KRIPKE, supra note 1, at 24 (citing 1966 study).
54. See id.
55. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting four-year cycle of usefulness of
information).
56. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 737-47; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 685-87.
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Even if one accepts this proposition, however, the question of whether
the federal mandatory disclosure system is defensible on cost-benefit
grounds remains unansweredY The ECMH and noise theory still may
imply that the system is unlikely to survive a cost-benefit analysis, at least
for large, widely followed companies. In contrast, however, the complexi-
ties revealed by chaos theory render the answer far more uncertain. The
information lags and biases revealed by the nonlinear structure of public
capital markets suggest that information is important and has great value
over time. This revelation demands some investigation before any
conclusions can be drawn about the cost-benefit question. Although the
ECMH and noise theory give us no reason to concern ourselves with the
process of price formation in the market microstructure, these insights from
chaos theory mandate studying it closely. As Part IV shows, the price
discovery process in the market microstructure demonstrates that the
ECMH is false, even in its weak form, and that insights from chaos theory
promise a superior explanation of public capital market behavior.
IV. Price Discovery in the Market Microstructure
The ECMH assures us that securities have intrinsic value in the sense
that the market price of a security defines what the security is worth. If
this were true, it would be possible to calculate the value of a security in
the abstract, without regard to the interests of potential buyers and sellers
of that security. In fact, the prices of public securities are not determined
by such abstract analyses, but are instead determined solely as the result of
traders' orders meeting in the market.58 The process by which market
traders interact constitutes price discovery. Only through this process may
it be possible for the market to generate prices that equal fundamental
values. Due in part to widespread belief in the ECMH, the importance and
complexity of accurate price discovery is often overlooked, although it is
critical.59
57. Indeed, it is perhaps an unanswerable question.
58. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 386-87.
59. Robert Schwartz notes:
[Olur markets are not maximally efficient. Unfortunately, the prevailing
academic opinion is that markets are efficient. However, with intraday price,
quotation, and volume data becoming increasingly available to both practitioners
and academic researchers, statistical evidence is beginning to emerge that prices
are excessively volatile in short time intervals, that price discovery is imperfect,
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Accuracy of price discovery depends in large part on market transpar-
ency, the extent to which traders make order flows publicly known and
disclose orders, quotes, and trades.' In continuous markets like the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NAS-
DAQ) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), market transparency
is limited, and limited market transparency interferes with accurate price
discovery.6' Market transparency is further obscured by market fragmen-
tation, which occurs primarily as a result of the channeling of order flows
through numerous markets. Market fragmentation is further compounded
by the immediacy of markets, which enables trades to be made continuous-
ly throughout the trading day.62
Price discovery mechanisms in the market microstructure-and the
subsidiary issues of transparency, fragmentation, and immediacy-
influence trader actions to at least as great a degree as information flows
influence investor actions.63 As a result, inquiries concerning the
justifiable scope of the mandatory disclosure system, as well as evaluating
the merits of alleged violations of mandatory disclosure rules, must
acknowledge and account for the importance of price determination in the
market microstructure.
There is vigorous debate among financial economists and others as to
whether it is necessary, possible, or desirable to minimize the existence
and that trading costs are unduly high.
Id. at 384.
60. See id. at 386; see also Corinne M. Bronfinan, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Regulate
It, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 52, at 407, 409.
61. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 385. Price discovery in continuous markets is
obscured because (a) in quote-driven markets like NASDAQ, public participants do not
place priced orders (instead, dealers post quotes at which the public may trade), and (b) in
order-driven markets like the NYSE in which public participants commonly use limit orders
to establish the price at which their transactions will be executed, those limit orders are then
used to establish the price at which other public participants may trade. Id.
62. See id. at 384; see also Hans R. Stoll, Organization of the Stock Market:
Competition orFragmentation?, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note
52, at 399, 402-03. Moreover, the immediacy of trading offered in continuous markets
often contributes to market imperfections through higher trading costs, including the costs
of the bid-ask spread, the market impact costs of particular trades, and the costs of
commissions. Schwartz, supra note 52, at 389.
63. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 388-89.
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or consequences of market opaqueness, fragmentation, and inmediacy. 4
The debate is vigorous in part because a number of competing goals are
at stake, including not only market efficiency, but also market fairness,
competitiveness, and linkage. Pursuing these goals by altering the nature
of the market microstructure involves some trade-offs. For example,
increased transparency might improve efficiency but simultaneously impair
fairness. Additionally, minimizing fragmentation may improve linkage
between markets but simultaneously impair competitiveness.
This Article does not pretend to resolve this vigorous debate or any
aspect of it. Instead, it embraces two more modest goals. First, the
following analysis of price discovery, a central part of this debate, is
intended to illustrate the importance of the market microstructure in
determining the price of public securities. This Article demonstrates that
the process of price discovery contradicts the ECMH's prediction that
prices are random and shows instead that the process supports chaos
theory's prediction-and accompanying empirical evidence-that prices
exhibit nonlinear dependence. Second, the succeeding discussion relates
this result back to the discussion of the federal mandatory disclosure
system and the limitations of noise theory, event studies, and the ECMH
in evaluating that system.
A. Property Rights and Evolving Markets
A threshold issue in the debate concerning the mechanisms of price
discovery in the market microstructure is: Whose information is it? Is
information concerning price discovery-quotes, trades, and prices-the
property of the exchanges or other markets through which it is generated,
or is the information more properly characterized as public property?
Early disputes over this question concluded that the exchanges themselves
had property rights in the information.' More recently, however, this
64. See id. at 385-92. Professor Schwartz has suggested that market opaqueness,
fragmentation, and immediacy could be addressed by alternative market structures, such as
call-market trading. See id. at 386, 389-91.
65. See Corinne Bronfman & James A. Overdahl, Would the Invisible Hand Produce
Transparent Markets?, 19 J. CoRp. L. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 7, on file with
author) (citing Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905)).
Corinne Bronfnan and James Overdahl offer amusing anecdotes that demonstrate the lengths
to which the exchanges have gone to protect information regarding price discovery and to
which nonmember brokers have gone to uncover such information. One example is the
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property right in information has been weakened, primarily by the
establishment of the National Market System (NMS) in 1975.
66
1. The National Market System
The SEC established the NMS under a congressional mandate and in
the name of efficiency, fairness, and market linkage.67 Establishment of
the NMS was prompted by growing opaqueness and fragmentation of the
capital market structure, "in which multiple markets offering limited access
traded the same securities without publicly disseminating quote and trade
information. '6  In part through a system of comprehensive disclosure
showing where and how to obtain the best execution for orders, the NMS
sought to establish a market that would generate the best prices.69 In
establishing the NMS, the SEC abolished fixed commission rates,
established a consolidated quotation system and transaction tape, and
enhanced market linkage-all of which contributed to reducing transaction
costs and increasing market transparency. 70 As noted, establishment of the
NMS also weakened the exchanges' property rights in the information of
price discovery.7'
Baker Blackout, during which the exchanges soaped their windows and nonmember brokers
removed bricks from the exchange wall to observe trading action. See id. at 6-7 & n.9.
66. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 97,
111-17.
67. See Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market Developments,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,311, at 85,030 (Jan. 27, 1994)
[hereinafter Market 2000 Study].
68. Id. Establishment of the NMS was also motivated in substantial part by political
pressure to address a number of anticompetitive practices-including fixed commission
rates-that emerged as the result of substantial self-regulation of stock exchanges. See Cox
ET AL., supra note 41, at 1284-85.
69. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,030 (discussing establishment of NMS
in Securities Acts Amendments of 1975).
70. See Bronfinan & Overdahl, supra note 65, at 7; Roberta S. KIrmel, The Market
2000 Study, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1992, at 3, 3.
71. See supra text accompanying note 66. Viewing public securities markets within
a public goods framework has often been criticized. See J. Harold Mulherin, Market
Transparency: Pros, Cons, and Property Rights, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 52, at 375, 379-80.
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Great controversy has surrounded both the establishment and the
implementation of the NMS. Many have criticized the SEC (and Congress)
for failing to state clearly the precise mission to be accomplished by the
creation of the NMS and for failing to explain how particular regulations
were designed to further any such mission. The fundamental policy
question that the SEC has not expressly answered is whether erecting and
maintaining a single, regulated market is more desirable than permitting
competition to flourish.' Instead, the SEC has taken a middle position by
adopting an "evolutionary" approach to the subject of the structure of the
U.S. equity markets.'
The SEC's middle ground is reflected in its pragmatic approach to
defining property rights in market information. The SEC has taken the
position that information concerning price discovery is public information,
but has done so in the name of market competition.74 Under the NMS,
for example, the SEC promulgated its "firm quotation rule," which requires
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) "to make available
72. See Cox ET AL., supra note 41, at 1286-89 (citing, among other criticisms,
Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National
Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 337-41; Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the
Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
883 (1981); Joel Seligman, The Future of the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79,
130-33 (1984); Walter Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755
(1984)).
73. See generally Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release
No. 14,416, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,502 (Jan. 26, 1978).
The SEC has often been criticized for lacking any vision and has been viewed as vacillating
in response to external pressure. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional
Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 876-92 (1994).
74. Participants in the debate over the NMS also argue the relative merits of the many
different kinds of capital market structures in the United States. In the late 1970s, two
visions prevailed, both of which were to be order-driven continuous-auction models: a
stronger NYSE primary market in which all trades would interact or an electronic system
in which all trades would be executed automatically at the best price. See Karmel, supra
note 70, at 3. More recently, the quote-driven dealer model of the NASDAQ has been
heralded by some as the optimal market structure. See id. In addition, some have argued
that the call-auction model used by the Arizona Stock Exchange and other proprietary
trading systems would best serve the interests of investors. See Schwartz, supra note 52,
at 386 & n.5. As Roberta Karmel has observed, Congress has offered little guidance on the
direction to be taken, and the SEC is unlikely to be able to move markets in any one of
these directions. See Karmel, supra note 70, at 3. At best, the SEC can only tinker with
the price discovery mechanisms in these evolving markets.
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to information vendors full quotation information on those [over-the-
counter] securities designated as NMS securities." '" The SEC ruled in
1984 that in selling information to vendors, the NASD could collect fees for
that information, but those fees could only be based on the NASD's costs
of collecting and providing the information, not on the basis of the informa-
tion's value to the vendors. 6 In short, the SEC's ruling, which followed
a congressional mandate, "decreed that the prices produced by an exchange,
once produced, were part of the public domain."' That position, in turn,
was intended to encourage competition "among providers of trade-execution
services to investors."78 In effect, the SEC's position treats the informa-
tion as private property affected with a public interest.79
2. Continuing Evolution of the Equity Markets
Since the establishment of the NMS, U.S. equity markets have changed
substantially. Demographically, the number of individual investor trading
accounts doubled between 1975 and 1990 (from twenty-five million to fifty-
one million), although much of this individual participation is conducted
through institutional intermediaries, such as pension and mutual funds.' °
Perhaps the change most widely noted by legal scholars has been the
75. Bronfman & Overdahl, supra note 65, at 8 (citing S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.IlAcl-1
(1993).
76. See Bronfman & Overdahl, supra note 65, at 8-9 (citing Exchange Act Release No.
20,874, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,640, 17,643 (Apr. 24, 1984)); see also National Ass'n of See.
Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 801 F.2d 1415, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming SEC's administra-
tive order that fees be cost-based).
77. Bronfman & Overdahl, supra note 65, at 9. By placing exchange-produced prices
in the public domain, this approach, or at least the SEC's ruling, has been criticized on the
ground that it views the NASD only as the "exclusive information processor" and ignores
its status as "the discoverer of market prices." Id. Bronfman and Overdahl also report that
the opposite is true for futures markets regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission-information there is treated as private property. See id.
78. Id. at 10. The emergence of screen-based trading systems like Instinet and
Portfolio Systems for Institutional Trading results from increased competition among
providers of trade-execution services and results in lower costs of trading. See id. at 10-11.
79. In the separate-but-related context of municipal bonds, the SEC recently has
proposed rules that would require the disclosure of bids, prices, markups, and related
information regarded by many as proprietary.
80. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,031.
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institutionalization of the markets, in which institutions in 1992 owned
slightly more than fifty percent of U.S. equities, up from thirty percent in
1975.1 Perhaps the change least noted by legal scholars is the equally
important increase in technological innovation. Technology in account
handling and automation has matured rapidly in recent years. Innovations
have affected the entire process of price discovery, and the most revolution-
ary innovations have come about through the automation of order entry,
routing, execution, and reporting.'
Structurally, there has been a pronounced increase in trading on
alternative markets that compete with the NYSE, the NASD, and the
American Stock Exchange (ASE). Nevertheless, the NYSE and the ASE
continue to serve as the primary forum of price discovery for listed
securities in U.S. equity markets, and NASDAQ serves the same role for
unlisted securities.' The five regional stock exchanges' 4 compete with
the NYSE and the ASE for order flow pursuant to grants of unlisted trading
privileges. 5 Proprietary tradings systems-automated electronic trading
networks called PTSs-also compete for the trade of stocks listed on the
NYSE, the ASE, and the regional exchanges.' The competition for order
81. Id.; cf. Coffee, supra note 73, at 837 & n.3.
82. The SEC's Division of Market Regulation notes:
For example, a customer's order to buy 100 shares of a stock at the market price
in 1975 could have taken up to an hour to travel from the branch office to the
firm's trading desk, to the firm's broker on the floor of the exchange, to the
specialist post, and back through the firm to the customer. Today the entire
process-fromthe entry of the order to notificationof the execution-cantake less
than a minute and is often completed while the customer is still on the telephone.
Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,031-32.
83. Id. at 85,032, 85,034. The NYSE still serves as the primary forum for price
discovery for listed securities despite the decline in trading volume on the NYSE from 86%
of all trades in 1981 to 67% in 1991. See Karmel, supra note 70, at 4.
84. The regional stock exchanges are the Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Pacific, and
Philadelphia Stock Exchanges. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,033.
85. Id. Orders are typically routed over the SEC-created Intermarket Trading System
(ITS), through which they are exposed to other markets for trading interest. If no other
market expresses an interest, then the order is executed at the highest quotation in the ITS.
Id.
86. Professor Karmel notes:
Proprietary trading systems collect indications of trading interest and rebroadcast
them through one or more designated broker-dealers. Procedures for executing
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flow is keen and reflects the substantial value of that order flow.'
Competition for order flow for all stocks also comes from substantial trading
through other means, including "fax trading" (the trading of U.S. equity
securities on foreign markets).88 The resulting market fragmentation has
substantial implications for the price discovery process because it reduces
market transparency and enables nonexchange markets to use exchange-
produced market information at relatively low cost. 9
B. Existing Levels of Transparency and Reform
The SEC's Division of Market Regulation (the Division) recently
released its study of the effect of changes in U.S. equity markets on the
existing level of market transparency.' ° The study revisited the same
questions originally posed by the establishment and implementation of the
NMS and considered a number of prescriptions for regulatory reform,
ranging from the strong interventionist approach of creating a "single
market" to the deregulatory approach of substantially dismantling the SEC's
oversight role.91 As in the original establishment and implementation of
or settling transactions at volume and price levels are agreed upon, but the
systems do not provide a guarantee or expectation of liquidity or embrace the
traditional exchange notion of membership.
Karmel, supra note 70, at 4.
87. See Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,033.
88. See id. at 85,034.
89. In addition to the effects of market fragmentation on the price discovery process,
trades in the burgeoning stock index futures market have also come to play an important role
in price discovery. See id.
90. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67. The study was prompted by criticism from the
General Accounting Office, which excoriated the SEC for failing to conduct a comprehen-
sive review of the U.S. equity markets for over a decade. See Karmel, supra note 70, at
4 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES TRADING: SEC ACTION NEEDED TO
ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM IssuEs 21, 33 (1990)). According to Professor
Karmel: "The SEC's frustrations in trying to implement the 1975 Securities Acts
Amendments have made the agency shy of market structure initiatives." Id. at 3-4. That
"shyness" may explain why the connection between the mandatory disclosure system and the
process of price discovery has not been seriously confronted, which is why Part V of this
Article recommends that the SEC begin to study this overlooked relationship. See infra
notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
91. See Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,036-37.
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the NMS, the study rejected these polar positions and opted instead for a
series of modulated reform proposals. 2
In rejecting the strong interventionist position, the Division concluded
that "the U.S. equity markets are not fragmented to the point that price
discovery and liquidity have been adversely affected. "'  However, the
Division also rejected an aggressive deregulatory program on the grounds
that the existing regime represents a "carefully maintained equilibrium" that
balances competitive forces on the one hand with the preservation of market
integrity and the "needs of market users" on the other hand.'
In maintaining the current regime, the Division recommended a series
of incremental reforms, including-most importantly-increased market
transparency.95 As noted above, market transparency denotes the "real-
time dissemination of information about prices, volume, and trades."'
The Division noted its belief "that transparency plays a fundamental role in
the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets. Transparency ensures
that stock prices fully reflect information."97 Transparency is critical to
the existence of "an efficient price discovery mechanism."98
The Division's study emphasizes the crucial roles of market transparen-
cy and the price discovery mechanism in achieving market efficiency, the
goal that the ECMH assures us has already been met. In particular, market
opaqueness contradicts even the weak form of the ECMH, which holds that
current market prices reflect all past prices, and implies precisely the
opposite, for the requisite information is simply not as widely available as
the ECMH necessarily assumes.
92. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining that SEC has taken
"evolutionary" approach to reform).
93. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,037.
94. Id.
95. In addition to transparency, the other prongs of the Division's recommendations
focused on "fair treatment of investors, fair market competition, and market access." Id.
at 85,038.
96. Id. at 85,039; see Mulherin, supra note 71, at 375 ("A perfectly transparent market
would be an environment in which all relevant information including transaction prices,
trading volume, quotes, order flow, and trader identification is instantaneously available to
all potential investors. In many respects, therefore, a perfectly transparent market resembles
the economist's notion of a perfectly competitive market.").
97. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,039.
98. Id.
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In short, the study's recommended changes (even if modest)19 are a
clear indication of skepticism about market efficiency. The need for these
changes shows not only that the process of price discovery in U.S. equity
markets is complex, but more importantly that the process cannot be relied
upon to produce prices equal to fundamental values, despite the ECMH's
predictions to the contrary. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that
the proposed changes (or any other regulatory reforms or competitive
forces) will advance the cause that the ECMH claims has already been
achieved. Consequently, the proposed changes reinforce the need to
understand the market microstructure when evaluating and enforcing
mandatory disclosure rules. Consideration of a few principal issues that the
study addressed demonstrates some of the ways in which existing price
discovery processes do not assure the production of prices equal to
fundamental values-in other words, that the ECMH is false.
Display of Customer Orders. Limit orders represent one of the
primary means by which public customers instruct brokers to make stock
trades. They are orders to buy or sell a security at a specific price."
At present, the exchanges (self-regulatory organizations or SROs) and
NASDAQ do not disclose information with respect to limit orders, although
the PTSs do.'0 ' The failure to display limit orders that are priced better
than the best available quotes can "present an inaccurate representation of
trading interest to other markets, thus contributing to fragmentation." 1'
Moreover, because trades are usually made at the bid or ask price, the
concealment of limit orders obscures the real price spread and therefore
impairs accurate price discovery.'" 3 Of course, customers placing limit
orders may prefer that they not be disclosed," but it should be recog-
99. See Karmel, supra note 70, at 4.
100. DIVISION OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SPECIAL REP. No.
1271, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 4-1 (1988). By contrast, market orders are
orders to buy or sell a security at the best current market price. Id.
101. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,039.
102. Id.
103. See id. Obscuring the real spread also creates the risk of enriching market makers
at the expense of public customers. Id.
104. Many investors prefer nondisclosure of their orders and trades, in part to minimize
the market impact of their trades. See Mulherin, supra note 71, at 378 ("This desire for
anonymity is not peculiar to securities markets and also appears in settings as diverse as
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nized that respecting that desire impairs accurate price discovery. The
Division recommended balancing these interests by urging the SROs and
NASDAQ to consider ways to increase the display of such orders."°5
Display of SelectNet Orders. Related to the current narrow disclosure
of limit orders is the narrow disclosure of orders through the SelectNet
system. SelectNet is a screen-based trading system used by NASD
members trading securities through automated systems.'0 6 Information
transmitted via SelectNet is selectively displayed to only some market
makers. The Division expressed concern about the "limited availability of
information regarding SelectNet orders."' Like its recommendations to
enhance disclosure of limit orders, the Division recommended broader
dissemination of information conveyed through SelectNet, on the grounds
that limited availability impairs transparency and therefore "frustrates
competitive pricing. "108
Display of Nontraditional Trading. The Division also called for
greater transparency in connection with after-hours trading and trades in
U.S. equity securities nominally executed abroad."° After-hours and off-
shore trading have grown substantially in recent years, but existing
reporting mechanisms do not accurately reflect such trading."10 "Because
full and accurate reporting of trades contributes to market efficiency and
artwork and oil tankers."). Mandatory disclosure of limit orders could impair liquidity by
making such investors reluctant to trade. See id.
105. See Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,039.
106. Id. at 85,040.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 85,041. Nontraditional, off-exchange trading has heightened the debate
over transparency because as traditional exchanges become more transparent compared to
other venues such as off-shore markets, more orders may flow to those other markets. This
flow would increase fragmentation and ultimately impair overall transparency. See
Mulherin, supra note 71, at 378-79. Transparency has also been the subject of vigorous
debate among European exchanges. See Karmel, supra note 70, at 4.
110. See Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,041 ("In the first six months of 1993,
approximately 17 million shares per day in NYSE and NASDAQ/NMS securities were
executed after regular trading hours (half of which were faxed to off-shore trading desks for
execution).").
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fairness," the Division recommended developing a reporting system to
reflect all such after-hours and off-shore trading."'
Order Exposure Rule. In addition to its recommendations directed
toward greater market transparency, the Division also raised anew the
desirability of an order exposure rule. Such a rule would require a market
maker to guarantee the execution of a customer order at a proposed price
and either bid publicly or offer the order at a better price before executing
it."' The rule would increase the visibility of orders, although at some
cost to market participants."' The NYSE has been considering an order
exposure rule for over a decade, and the Division recommended further
consideration of such a rule once its other recommendations concerning
market transparency have been adopted.1
4
Disclosure of Payment for Order Flow. Dealers and specialists seek
retail order flow from brokers by paying cash or offering other inducements
to brokers, who in return direct orders to the dealers and specialists for
execution. " 5 Such payments or inducements may lead brokers to breach
the fiduciary duty that they owe to their customers because the payments or
inducements may impair best price execution for such orders." 6  The
Division noted its belief that payment for order flow arises because
competition for order flow on the basis of price quotations alone is
inadequate."' The Division concluded that adoption of the transparency
reforms discussed above would promote competition on the basis of
quotations and thus would eliminate or minimize the need for direct
intervention with respect to the practice of payment for order flow."' In
addition, however, the Division recommended that disclosure of the practice
111. Id.; see Mulherin, supra note 71, at 379 ("One possible response in this current
gap is to record the off-exchange trades on a run-off tape that would be consolidated with
currently recorded transactions.").
112. Market 2000 Study, supra note 67, at 85,041.
113. Id. at 85,041-42.
114. See id.





of payment for order flow and the particular arrangements used to handle
the orders appear on the customer confirmation and annual account
statements.119
Best Price Execution Generally. The Division also generally
emphasized the continuing obligation of brokers and dealers to achieve best
price execution for customers.120 To that extent, the Division recom-
mended that brokers and dealers using automated trading procedures
nevertheless continually monitor the quality of their execution methods to
ensure that they are obtaining best execution of trades not only with respect
to price, but also with respect to speed of execution. Similarly, the
Division recommended that markets and market makers offer price
improvement devices on various markets.2'2
The foregoing issues highlight a number of imperfections in the market
microstructure that impede price discovery and therefore interfere with any
identity between the resulting market price and fundamental values. These
imperfections not only reflect market disobedience to the ECMH, but also
confirm the conclusion that neither the ECMH nor event studies should be
119. See id. at 85,042-43 (citing Payment for Order Flow, Exchange Act Release No.
33,026, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,934 (Oct. 13, 1993)). Brokers often provide research and other
services to investment advisors in exchange for brokerage commissions arising from trades
in particular securities. These "soft dollar" arrangements relate primarily to institutional
transactions rather than to retail trades. As with payment for order flow, soft dollar
arrangements can also impair best execution of investor trade orders. See id. at 85,043.




122. The Division stated:
Auction principles dictate that trades in exchange-listed securities will be
effected so that the orders will be exposed to other public orders or interest in
a trading crowd, with the possibility that the order may receive a price that is
better than existing quotations. Automated, quote-based executions for listed
securities discard the possibility of price improvement for speedier executions.
Some regional exchanges and third market dealers have incorporated order
exposure and price improvement features into their small order execution
systems to address this concern.
Id. at 85,043-44.
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given a prominent place in the discussion or the enforcement of the
mandatory disclosure system.
One final issue concerning market pricing systems leaves no doubt
about this conclusion. NYSE stocks are currently quoted and traded in
prices broken down to one-eighth of a dollar."2 How can one argue that
market prices accurately reflect fundamental values when prices are broken
down in increments of only 12.5 cents per share? Although the average
price of stocks traded on the NYSE may be sufficiently high so that 12.5
cents is not a material percentage of the price, disputes concerning the
valuation of NYSE companies often are fought-at great expense-down to
the last penny.'24 While one should not make too much of this point, it
does indicate-when taken together with the other issues raised by the
Division's study-that a strong agnostic stance toward the ECMH and event
studies is warranted, particularly in mandatory disclosure discussions.
Whether the Division's reform proposals, which are modest and largely
precatory, will succeed in promoting competition, fairness, and efficiency
- remains to be seen. The implied balance of regulatory reform and
competitive forces may be the proper approach to the questions of price
discovery, fragmentation, and market transparency. That important issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.'" The existing struc-
ture-or, for that matter, any structure that emerges through regulatory
reform or competitive forces-is not likely to make the process of price
discovery materially more pure than it is. As a result, exposure of the
underlying issues addressed by the Division's study illustrates a broader
123. The Division recommended the elimination of the prevailing one-eighth pricing
system in order to enhance intramarket transparency. See id. at 85,039-40. The Division
also noted its belief that a decimal pricing system is "preferable and may be inevitable."
Id. at 85,040. According to the Division, the existing system poses problems for accurate
price discovery because its "minimum variation can cause artificially wide spreads and
hinder quote competition by preventing offers to buy or sell at prices inside the prevailing
quote." Id. at 85,039.
124. On the ASE, prices are reported in increments of one-sixteenth; on NASDAQ,
prices are reported in increments of one-thirty-second for stocks bid at less than $10. Id.
at 85,039 n.43. Following the release of the study, the NASD changed its pricing increment
to one-sixty-fourth, much to the dismay of many traders. See William Power, Informal Poll
Shows Nasdaq Policy Upsets More Than 32/64 of Traders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1994, at
B1.
125. For an introduction to the terms of that debate and a framework within which it
may be analyzed, see generally Bronfman & Overdahl, supra note 65.
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point: that discussion and analysis of the mandatory disclosure system
should be linked to an understanding of the complexities and imperfections
of the price discovery process.
V. Linking Mandatory Disclosure and Price Discovery
Apart from the issue of whether competition, regulation, or a balanced
mixture of both will best serve the public interest, the importance and
complexity of price discovery underscores the problem that one confronts
in evaluating the 1934 Act's mandatory disclosure rules by reference to the
ECMH and without reference to the market microstructure. The Division's
study and its reform proposals, as well as the vigorous debate on the
subjects discussed above, emphasize the importance of the market
microstructure to accurate price discovery. While the ECMH and noise
theory seem oblivious to the importance of this factor, chaos theory
mandates taking it into account. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the state
of research on chaos theory and to postulate a program through which
chaos theory might equip market scholars and practitioners with an
improved understanding of capital market behavior.
A. State of Research
Research on chaos and capital markets is in its infancy and has perhaps
raised more questions than it has answered, but that fact should not
preclude continued exploration. Indeed, the questions that the research on
chaos and capital markets raises cannot be answered by the ECMH or noise
theory, and the complexities that the research reveals are not even
considered by those theories. Despite its infancy, the research and its
accompanying technology are developing fairly rapidly. For example,
evidence revealed by rescaled range analysis shows that the Standard and
Poor's 500 Index (S&P Index) exhibits a pattern: an average life cycle of
approximately four years." This evidence indicates that there is a strong
persistent element in the S&P Index, rather than the pure randomness that
the ECMH would predict. In fact, the market does not begin to lose
memory of events until after four years have passed.
Many market participants have recognized the insights that chaos
theory and nonlinear dynamics offer and have designed elaborate trading
126. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting four-year cycle of usefulness of
information).
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techniques to exploit those insights. 27 Those participants regard the
techniques as highly proprietary and have neither the incentive nor the
inclination to make the techniques public. That information, however,
could go a long way toward improving our understanding of public capital
market behavior and could assist in the protection of investors. This
Article does not suggest that market participants who rely on insights from
chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics should be forced to disclose their
information. On the contrary, their entrepreneurial energy should be
respected, and they should be permitted to profit from their industry. This
Article does suggest, however, that the SEC should recognize the value and
importance of this information and consider ways of harnessing this
information for the broader benefit of both investors and the public.
B. Proposal for a Research Project
There are several possible ways to generate research on chaos
technologies that would advance both the economic goal of protecting
investors and the broader-but inseparable-social goal of enriching our
understanding of public capital market behavior. The SEC itself could
undertake a research project concerning the relevance of chaos theory to
public capital markets. Such an effort could be conducted along the lines
of the Division's study or along the lines of previous efforts that have been
aimed at developing forward-looking information, Management's Discus-
sion and Analysis (MD&A) practice, and disclosure practice generally.
However, this project is likely to be more sophisticated than those and is
likely to require resources not readily at the SEC's disposal. Accordingly,
a more appropriate approach may be to limit the SEC's direct role in the
initial project to that of coordinator and to allow private institutions to be
the driving force behind the project.
In this sense, the project could -more nearly resemble the SEC's
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval project, rather than its
MD&A-related projects. Investors, market makers, and registrants could
be asked to participate voluntarily in the project. Market participants who
have been developing the advanced trading techniques should be encouraged
to participate. The goal would be the production and public dissemination
127. See generally David Berreby, Chaos Hits Wall Street, DISCOVER, Mar. 1993, at
76; Matt Ridley, Frontiers of Finance: On the Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1993, at
Survey 3; Gary Weiss, Chaos Hits Wall Street-The Theory, That Is, Bus. WK., Nov. 2,
1992, at 138.
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of general information on chaos theory and public capital markets. If that
project were to enhance our understanding of the behavior of particular
securities in the light of broader market forces, then consideration could be
given to dedicating a single page in SEC filings to a summary of the
processes affecting a registrant's particular securities.
At least initially, an absolute safe harbor could be provided that would
fully insulate the registrant from liability for the informational statements
made on that page of the SEC filing. Moreover, in addition to the
conventional cautionary language included in difficult disclosure contexts,
a broad disclaimer of responsibility for the statements could be included,
along with a clear statement that no party will be liable for anything that the
party says. To avoid the temptation to use such a page to include
fraudulent statements, any such disclosure could be subject to the direct
review of the SEC, which would have the absolute right to permit or reject
the disclosure.
The overall goal of the project would be to identify and to attempt to
quantify the price impact of non-firm-oriented information, including
information in the market microstructure. The results likely would assist
our understanding of public capital market behavior and the role of firm-
oriented and market information within the market. Those results would
enable better evaluation of the appropriate degree of mandatory disclosure
and would indicate how to evaluate the merits of alleged violations. Those
lessons could lead to a range of prescriptions, from abolishing mandatory
disclosure completely (including firm-oriented information) to calling for
substantially broader mandatory disclosure at the level of registrants and
firm-oriented information and in the context of the market microstructure.
The contours of any prescription to broaden mandatory disclosure for
registrants would likely include substantial use of safe harbor provisions,
particularly with respect to information that, according to chaos theory's
predictions, will have a particular impact on specified securities."
I. Conclusion
While the existing state of chaos theory research raises more questions
than it answers, one thing is clear: Price discovery in capital markets is
128. The use of safe harbor provisions for registrants simply recognizes the likelihood
that any such information is bound to rest on theoretical premises that are not necessarily
susceptible to proof or verification and may in fact turn out to be wrong-just as the ECMH
has turned out to be wrong.
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imperfect. Market opaqueness and fragmentation necessarily entail pricing
imperfections, which produce prices that do not equal fundamental values
and which undermine claims of market efficiency. 9 An understanding
of the market microstructure becomes critical to evaluating both the
mandatory disclosure system under the 1934 Act and methods such as event
studies that attempt to assess the merits of alleged disclosure rules
violations. In short, how much confidence can there be in the relationship
between the disclosure of information by registrants and the resulting price
effect wheh the market microstructure and price discovery mechanisms are
rough and unsteady at best?
At a minimum, we should not look exclusively to market price
histories to determine whether or to what extent disclosure violations occur.
Instead, we should see market price effects discerned from event studies as
only one factor among others when issues of materiality or other legal
questions arise under the mandatory disclosure system. Other measures
should also be used. Once the fact that market prices are not the best
measure of security holders' damages is accepted, we should turn to
fundamental valuation baselines.
These valuation techniques necessarily involve substantial exercise of
judgment in evaluating the merits of alleged disclosure violations. Some
advocates of event studies promote them precisely on the ground that they
make engaging in such exercises of judgment unnecessary. 30 However,
as is well known but not always acknowledged, event studies themselves
demand substantial exercises of judgment, as the difficulties in defining an
event window attest. Once we recognize the substantial role that judgment
plays in conducting event studies and the narrow piece of the puzzle that
substantial judgment enables us to see, then exercising judgment regains its
appropriate place. The result of exercising that judgment is that we are
provided a more complete basis for assessing the mandatory disclosure
system and evaluating the merits of alleged violations of disclosure rules.
129. See Mulherin, supra note 71, at 377 ("Conceptually, if securities prices were
perfectly transparent, then investors would know, at any time, the fundamental value of any
public issue. While an apparently laudable goal, this perfect transparency sets up a
paradox-as securities prices become perfectly known, there is less individual return to
discovering new information.").
130. Cf. ROMANO, supra note 25, at 60 ("The event study's importance is in measuring;
by providing an anchor for determining value, it eliminates reliance on ad hoc judgments
about the impact of specific information ('events') on stock prices.").
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It has been said that one is perhaps better off not knowing how laws
or sausages are made. ECMH devotees often seem to adopt this advice by
refusing to recognize how prices are made. Chaos theory and nonlinear
dynamics suggest that we should not refuse to look. We should not see the
mandatory disclosure system as a closed set; rather, we should see the
system as situated in a broader, more complex context that includes the
process of price discovery in the market microstructure. While debate on
the respective merits of promoting market transparency or minimizing
market fragmentation is vigorous and far from settled, the terms of the
debate'illustrate the need to link an understanding of the market microstruc-
ture with the methods of assessing the mandatory disclosure system and
evaluating the merits of alleged violations of mandatory disclosure rules.

